CHAP. IV.

I COME next, as I proposed to shew the absurdity of that principle: That an imaginary idea of Christ as man is helpful to the faith of his being God-man; and also to shew, that no imaginary idea of any corporeal object can give any help, either to the divine or human faith of any truth or proposition relating to that object. This, one would think, is obvious enough to any that will but endeavor to exercise the reason that God hath given them. Mr. Robe asserts, That it is necessary to a right conception of Christ as God-man, to have an imaginary idea of him as man. His argument, I think, may be reduced to this form: If we cannot believe that Christ is God-man, without an imaginary idea of him as man, then an imaginary idea of him as man is necessary to the believing that he is God-man. But so it is, that we cannot believe that his God-man, without an imaginary idea of him as man: Therefore, &c.—I answer, (1.) By denying the sequel of the major, or first proposition: For, though it should be granted, that we cannot believe in him as God-man, without an imaginary idea of him as man, yet it will not follow, that therefore that imaginary idea is necessary to the believing that he is God-man; because that imaginary idea is not necessary to faith, or to the act of believing, but only necessarily in the man that doth believe, in so far as he is a man that hath flesh, as well as spirit, not as he is a believer, but a man endued with an imaginative faculty, by which he hath the notion of a man, a human body: Which imaginative faculty is not at all the faculty or power by which he believes; for he believes by a spiritually enlightened understanding, carrying the will along with it, towards Christ. But, though the said imaginative faculty attends some way necessarily with the person believing, who is the subject in which that faculty naturally resides; yet that imaginative faculty, and its exercise representing the image of a man, is no more concerned in the act itself or believing, than it is able to apprehend the object of faith, namely, the glorious person of the God-man. Hence, (2.) There is a manifest fallacy in the argument, namely, what is called by logicians, fallacia a dicto secundum quid. It is true as spoke of the imaginative faculty, that relates to what is corporeal, or to the object of sense; but not as spoken of the believing faculty, that relates to a spiritual consideration of Christ’s humanity, and as it is the object of faith. The sensitive faculty acts towards what is sensible, or the corporeal faculty by an idea of what is corporeal; for the natural faculties and powers act in their natural ways. But these are distinct things in all respects, from the supernatural faculty and power of believing, which is exercised about the supernatural object of faith. Mr. Robe’s argument then confounds these things that are in themselves every way distinct, namely, faith and fancy; yea, faith and carnal sense. For, to speak of a spiritual imaginary idea of Christ as man, would be contradictory to common sense, and Mr. Robe’s own description of the objects of imaginary ideas, their being only corporeal things: Which being carnal things, and not spiritual, his argument necessarily confounds divine faith with carnal sense and carnal imagination.

To make any thing that is simply corporeal the object of faith, is to destroy the very nature of faith: For, as the learned Ravenal says, Thesaurus scripturæ, vol. 1. p. 995. Quod ea sit fidei natura, ut etiam res invisibiles, &, judicio humano, impossibiles, apprehendat, Rom. iv. 18. Heb. xi. 1. Adde quoque, 2. Cor. iv. 18. Unde dicitur, Quod per fidem ambulemus, non per aspectum; quia fides facit, ut apprehendamus res invisibiles quarum aspectu nondum potimur. That it is the nature of faith to apprehend things invisible, and, to human judgment, impossible, Rom. iv. 18. Heb. xi. 1. 2 Cor. iv. 18. Hence it is said, We walk by faith, not by sight; because faith makes us apprehend things invisible, whereof we do not as yet enjoy the sight.

That which is simply corporeal is the object of sense, and not of faith. The imaginary idea, having for its object only what is simply and merely corporeal, comprehends no part of the object of faith. Add, that to be simply corporeal, is to be so in itself; But that part of the human nature of Christ which is corporeal, was never merely or simply so in itself, any more than the whole human nature of Christ, which was never human nature in itself. And therefore that corporeal thing which the imaginary idea apprehends, being simply corporeal in itself, was never any part of the human nature of Christ; and therefore never any part of the object of faith, which conceives of Christ’s human nature as having no existence in itself, nor as subsisting any other way, but in the person of the Son of God. Which mysterious humanity transcends the intellectual ideas of all the rational world, much more the sensitive imaginary idea of mankind; and can only be conceived by spiritual supernatural light and saving faith, grounded upon gospel revelation. An imaginary idea, therefore, applied to this subject, is a mere chimerical principle, of which nothing can be understood but the name; or a sound of words, which the authors thereof may use, as an altar of refuge for their own ignorance. Whatever their design may be, they may say of their image of Christ formed in the brain by an imaginary idea, as Aaron said of the idol, I cast the gold into the fire, and there came out this calf. They bring forth an image of Christ in the brain, that diverts the mind from the true Christ, and from the true spiritual object of faith set before us in the gospel; where alone, beholding as in a glass his glory, we are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord, 2 Cor. iii. 18.

A true believer hath a threefold life, animal, rational, and supernatural. Imaginary ideas belong to the first, intellectual ideas to the second, and faith of God’s operation to the third. How ridiculous is it to bring in with the last of these what belongs to the first? One would think it very childish and ridiculous, to say, non can believe that Christ is God-man, having a true and a reasonable soul, without an intellectual idea of a human soul; much more to say, none can believe it, without the imaginary idea of a human body. Though both these natural powers be exerted, they come not near to the divine and supernatural power of faith; which acts in another sphere, and, as it were, in the third heavens, far above both the former. Shall faith in its act or object be considered by that which relates to the lowest sphere wherein men move, because the subject of inhesion wherein that faith is wrought, hath an animal life while in time? Is it like the speech of a rational man, or of a fool, to say, so frequently, and so solemnly, that a man cannot possibly believe in Christ, without having an animal life, or sensitive faculties? It were more agreeable to the common notion of a rational world, to say, none can believe in Christ unless he has reason and reflection, such as men have, than to say, he cannot believe in Christ unless he have animal powers and sensation, wherein brute beasts have such a great share with us, though they are destitute of reason. How ridiculous would it be to say, no man can possibly move or work with his fingers, without moving the nails that are upon the points of them; nor walk from one place to another without drawing his heels after him? Why, it is very true, he cannot well shake off his nails when he works, nor lay aside his heels when he walks, because they are natural to the make of his body; yet it may be possible for him to work, and never touch his work with his nails; and also, to walk, and yet never touch the ground with his heels. But, suppose he can neither work nor walk without them, how unreasonable is it to describe his working and walking by this limitation, or fine qua non, that without nails and heels he can do neither? Much more unreasonable is it to describe the actings of that superior and supernatural power of faith by this limitation, that they cannot take place without the company and concurrence of that inferior faculty of an imaginary or corporeal idea; which yet can by no means take up the invisible object of faith, the Lord Jesus Christ, in his person and glory. Christ’s divine person is absolutely invisible to us, 1 Tim. iv. 16. His glory also is invisible; only faith can behold it in the gospel glass where it is represented. 2 Cor. iii. 18. But the darkness and superstition of the minds of men have brought in images, to take the work of representing Christ and his glory out of the hands of the gospel; being able to make no affecting discovery of him in the word, thro’ their want of spiritual light, to make him the present object of their faith and love, as revealed and proposed in the gospel. This was the true origin of all the imageries in the church of Rome, and other image worship. Christ in his human nature being absent, and their minds being dark, carnal, and prone to superstition, as the minds of men are by nature, they would see nothing in the spiritual representation of him in the gospel, that did in any measure affect them: But in these images, as one says*[* Morning Exercises against Popery, vol. v. p. 223, 229, 231.], by the means of sight and imagination, they found that which did really work upon their affections, and, as they thought, did excite them to the love of Christ. Men not being able by the light of faith to discern the glory of things spiritual and invisible, do make images of them to themselves, as gods that may go before them: And these they are affected with; because they can see and feel, and, in their own imagination, are sensibly excited unto devotion by them. But the worship of the church is spiritual, and the glory of it is invisible to the eyes of flesh; as both our Saviour and his apostles testify in the celebration of it: We are come unto mount Zion, &c. Heb. Xii. 22, 23, 24. The glory of this assembly does not appear to the sense and imaginations of men. See much more to this purpose in the Morning Exercises against Popery, vol. v. p. 231.

We may view the whole strength of Mr. Robe’s logic relating to the imaginary idea of Christ as man, its being helpful to the faith of his being God-man, in the following example: I am told, that such a person is a good man. Here, according to a logical division, we have, (1.) The subject, namely, a man. (2.) The predicate, or what is told of him, namely, goodness. (3.) The copula, or copulation and conjunction of these two together, namely, that he is a good man. Now, to form a right thought that such a man is a good man, I shall allow these three, according to Mr. Robe’s method, to be right. (1.) There is an imaginary idea we must have of that person as a man. (2.) An intellectual idea of goodness. (3.) A copulative or compounded idea compounding these two together. And so, by these three, we have a complete idea of him as a good man. And we cannot have the faith or belief of this, That he is a good man, without an imaginary idea of him as a man. Well, here is good enough natural logic, and this is the natural order wherein we conceive of natural things; though at the same time it is evident, the imaginary idea of the subject gives no help of itself to the intellectual idea of the predicate. Even though I cannot think of goodness, without thinking of  a subject of inhesion in which it resides, I must not dwell upon, or stand poring on the image of the man; for the more I do so, the more I am hindered from the notion of goodness. The corporeal idea does not further, but hinder my understanding. Much more is it thus in spiritual things.

But this foresaid logic Mr. Robe applies very absurdly to the knowledge of God in Christ, or to the knowledge of Christ, and the faith of his being God-man in one person; which not at all suits with any natural example of that sort: For here it is not man that is the subject, but God, or the person of the Son of God. Though I am not here to dispute the natural order of ideas that philosophers speak of, and their rise and origin from sensation and reflection, but allow the first thing that presents itself in the foresaid example of a good man, is the subject of that predicate, namely, the idea of a man; yet I do not allow, that this order will hold in spiritual things, that are the object of saving faith; particularly in that which Mr. Robe speaks of concerning Christ as man; where he makes the first thing pertaining to the knowledge of him to be an imaginary idea of Christ as man. This I deny; and would illustrate the contrary by the following plain proposition. For example, this, That Christ is man. In this example, it is easy to see, that it is not in this, as in the former example of a good man, where man was the subject, and goodness the predicate; and therefore the man, in order of nature, was first in the imagination, and then goodness, as the thing asserted of him. But in this example it is quite otherwise. Christ is the subject, and man is the predicate; that is to say, here is, (1.) The subject spoken of, namely, Christ; which is the name of a person. (2.) The predicate, or that which is said of him, namely, that he is man. Here then Mr. Robe’s philosophy will be found vain and idle, if not profane and absurd. For, to make the first thing here, in order to believe that Christ is man, an imaginary idea of Christ as man, is to suppose that man is the subject, and Christ the predicate; which none that have common sense will aver: And yet to set the predicate, man, before the subject, Christ, here would be both a setting the object of sense before the object of faith, as he does, and an inverting his own order, and transgressing the common rule of natural philosophy; which supposes indeed, that the subject or person is the first thing to be known, and then the predicate, or what is said of the subject or person.

Thus, on the same head, when it is said, the Word was made flesh, or God was manifested in the flesh, or in the human nature; here it is plain, the subject is God, or the Word; the predicate is flesh, or the human nature. The first thing, therefore, in the knowledge of this mystery is not the imaginary idea of Christ as flesh; for that is but the predicate, and cannot be known in relation to its subject, till the subject itself be known, namely, God; in whom, and no otherwise, that human nature of Christ does subsist: And consequently, we can have no saving knowledge of Christ in his human nature, or as man, till we know him as God, and thus as God in Christ, God in our nature, not our nature in God, as if our nature were the first thing discernible in saving knowledge; but God in our nature; for our nature cannot be, nor be seen to be any part of the proper object of faith, till it be seen subsisting in the person of the Son of God; which cannot be seen by any imaginary idea, but only by faith. Christ being the name of a person, to see the man Christ is to see the person of the Son of God, to be now God-man, or Immanuel God with us. When we see God, or his glory, in the face of Christ, it is the person of Christ; not in him as man, but as God-man in one person.

As God only is the proper object of faith and worship, and Christ as the eternal Son of God is so, as well as any other person in the adorable Trinity; so the person of Christ as Mediator, may be considered, either with reference to his divine nature, or his human nature; the human nature, being assumed, is not the natural or proper, but rather (if I may use this word) the adventitious object of faith and worship, namely, by reason of its conjunction or union with the person of the Son of God.

Now, the imaginary idea cannot see it in this conjunction; and therefore cannot see it as the object of faith, or of worship. What a man sees of Christ only by his imaginary idea, is only corporeal: and therefore, not being God, it is not lawful for him to worship what he thus sees: Nor is it lawful for him to make it the object of his faith, because it is not God; it is only an image of a man formed in his brain: It is not the person of Christ, but the picture of Christ, in his human body that he sees there. But, says Mr. Robe, Christ as God-man cannot be conceived, without the imaginary idea of him as man. Ans. Christ as God-man is an inconceivable mystery, which cannot be seen but by that faith which is the substance of things not seen. An imaginary idea of anything corporeal spoken of, is a thing that belongs to the imaginary faculty of the person that believes and of which he cannot be free while clothed with flesh. But this imaginary idea of what is merely corporeal in Christ, belongs neither to the act nor the object of faith, nor to the means of it, as subservient thereto. (1.) Not to an act of faith; for faith is an act of the understanding, carrying the will with it; I mean of the understanding spiritualized, or spiritually enlightened. Nor, (2.) does it belong to the object of faith: For no corporeal thing as such is the object of faith, but of sense. The corporeity, or human body of Christ, can no more of itself, as it is the object of imagination, be the object of faith, than any other body can be so. Nor, (3.) Does it belong to means of faith, as any ways subservient or helpful thereunto. The corporeal faculties of sense and imagination are indeed helpful to give me the notion of a body, or outside of a man; but it cannot help me to know or believe any truth; no, not so much as this, That Adam was a man, or that he was the first man. Now, Mr. Robe’s logic tells me to this purpose, I cannot believe that Adam was a man, or that he was the first man, without an imaginary idea of him as a man; and that this idea is helpful to my believing him to my believing him to be so. I answer, it is false: For though this imaginary idea helps me to form in my mind the image of a man, not the image of a house, or a horse, but of a man; yet it cannot help me to know or believe any truth reported concerning that man. All the help the imaginary idea can give me to the knowledge and belief that Adam was a man, or the first man, is only to make me to conceive that Adam was neither a bird in the air, nor a beast of the field, nor a fish of the sea; but a man, or such a corporeal object which common sense distinguishes from all other corporeal objects, by the name and designation of a man. This is all the imaginary idea helps unto. But can it help me or any person to know and believe this truth, which I have learned from tradition, or from the Bible, That Adam was a man, and the first man? Nay, the imaginary idea of him as man, the more I dwell upon it, the more doth it mar and hinder, and divert me from the knowledge and belief of this truth, That he was a man, and that he was the first man. Nay, if I had no more but the imaginary idea of him as a man, I would neither have the knowledge nor belief of this proposition, That he was a man, nor that he was the first man. Truths and propositions are the objects of intellectual ideas; but cannot be the object of corporeal, sensitive, or imaginary ideas.

In consequence of what hath been said, let the truth or proposition to be known or believed be this, That Christ the second Adam, was a man. Now, says Mr. Robe, you cannot believe that Christ was a man, without an imaginary idea of him as man. And this idea is helpful and absolutely necessary; because you cannot know or believe in him as God-man, without the imaginary idea of him as man. Ans. This philosophy and logic is false and fallacious; as appears in this, That, though I cannot conceive him to be man, unless I had the idea of what a man is, or know the meaning of the word man, that it signifies neither a creature of the angelical nor brutal, but of the human kind; yet what says this to the believing of this truth, That he is man? That Christ the second Adam is man, is a truth to be believed, and an object of faith; but the imaginary idea of him as man, makes him the object of sense and fancy, and not of faith. It is a mental image, and picture of his human body in the brain, that ought neither to be worshipped or believed in: Nor can it be done without idolatry; because we are forbid to worship God by any image of our making or forming. The true Christ, our Immanuel God-man, is the only image of the invisible God, whom we are to adore, and by whom alone we are to believe in God, and worship him. But the image of Christ formed in the head by an imaginary idea of him as man, is not the true Christ, but a creature in the notion, a picture of his body in the brain; not so much as the object of an intellectual idea, but a sensitive; by the means whereof we cannot believe any truth whatsoever, human or divine.

See this in the most common things in the world. Let the assertion be, That Simon the tanner had a house. Why, says Mr. Robe’s logic, you cannot believe this without the imaginary idea of a house.  Solomon had a vineyard in Baalhamon. Well, but you cannot believe this without the imaginary idea of a vineyard. What childish work is this way of speaking? Tho’ all that the imaginary idea helps me to is to understand the meaning of the word house, and the word vineyard; that a house does not signify a horse, nor a vineyard a river, but that a house and a vineyard signify those things that the words represent to our mind: Yet none of these ideas contribute in the least to my believing the truth of these assertions, That either Simon had a house, or Solomon a vineyard; for the belief thereof is no way founded upon the meaning of the words, or idea of the outward things, but upon the testimony of the asserter, &c. Thus, when in spiritual things we speak of any truth, such as, That Christ is man, the imaginary idea of him as man is only at best a help to know the meaning of the word man, or an image in the head of that corporeal object which we call a man: But this in itself hath no tendency to help or further the faith of this truth, That Christ is man. The belief of this is founded only upon the word of God, and on the same testimony on which we believe that he is God, and God-man in one person.

To think of Christ that he is man, is a profitable and necessary thought; because it can be thought of believingly, as a divine truth: But to think of him qua man, or as man, is a diverting the mind from the object of faith, to an object of sense, and a vain, idle, and unprofitable attempt to know Christ after the flesh, or carnally, by a sensitive idea, not spiritually, by faith. But now, to say, we cannot know him spiritually by faith, without that sensitive idea, is all one as to say, we cannot know him after the spirit, without knowing him after the flesh. Well, what though this be a sad truth, yet these two ways of knowing him are as opposite as flesh and spirit, sin and duty. But to make the sinful and natural way of knowing him necessary to the dutiful and spiritual way, or the imaginary way necessary to the real, is vain philosophy, and abominable divinity.

When one thinks rightly of Christ as man, he thinks believingly. TO think believingly, is to think according to the word of revelation, that he hath a true body and a reasonable soul. To believe this, is not to have the imaginary idea of it, as if it were a corporeal object of sense, but to credit it as it is a divine truth, as much, and upon the same ground, as I believe that he is God; for both are believed upon the same testimony. Though it be corporeal; yet, as corporeal, it is not the object of faith, but of sense: But, as the object of faith, it is in the word, not in the head or the brain.

If Mr. Robe had said, we cannot believe Christ to be God-man, without believing him to be man, I would agree with that; for I make the human nature of Christ, as represented in the word, the object of faith. But, when he says, we cannot believe him to be God-man, without an imaginary idea of him as man, and that this is a necessary help to faith; this is what I reject, as a mixing of faith and sense, and a making, not divine revelation, but human sensation, a ground and means of faith. I reject it as a doctrine that causes to err from the words of knowledge, Prov. xix. 27. a doctrine that leads to imaginary faith and worship, and to a fostering in the minds of people that mental idolatry, which may open the door to gross outward idolatry. To believe that Christ is man is to believe that this glorious person Christ, is clothed with our human nature, or, that he hath assumed our nature into his own personality. And thus to believe that Christ is man, is one of the most necessary articles of the Christian faith, without which there is no believing unto salvation. But to conceive of Christ as man by an imaginary idea, the object whereof is not at all Christ, but a mere human or corporeal substance; this imaginary conception joined in with faith, is a confounding of faith and fancy; a blending together things as opposite as flesh and spirit, nature and grace; which, tho’ they be both residing in the same subject, namely, the believer, yet are as opposite as faith and unbelief. The imaginary idea of Christ as man is a fleshly consideration, flowing from nature, and most unprofitable and unhelpful to faith. But the faith of this truth, That Christ is man, includes a spiritual consideration of him, flowing from grace in the heart. Both these consideration may be in the same subject, and, perhaps too, much about the same time; but they are direct opposites, as much as spiritual light and spiritual darkness; which they that attempt to mix, are for mixing heaven and hell together.

Sensitive ideas can no more of themselves help to produce intellectual ones, than bodies can help to produce spirits; nor mere sense to produce reason, nor the animal to produce the rational life. And again, sense and reason of themselves can no more produce faith, than nature can produce grace; earth, heaven; or natural produce spiritual and supernatural life. But, if one shall say, in behalf of Mr. Robe, that without sense a man cannot have reason; and, without sense and reason, he cannot have faith; therefore the one is helpful to the other: This will easily be granted in one respect, but not in another. It is true in respect of the subjects that are acted upon, but not in respect of the activity of the subjects. Sense, reason, and the light of nature, are the passive qualifications of the subject of faith; because there cannot be faith in a stone, or in a beast, no more than there can be sin in them: Therefore sense and reason make a man in a passive capacity fit for grace, tho’ he have no active ability for it. In this respect, a thing may be said to be necessary in a natural or physical sense, or passively and subjectively; but this no way belongs to what is necessary and helpful in a moral or theological sense, or in any sense that is within the sphere of activity proper to it. Sense and reason act in their own different spheres, but faith in a superior orb, not at all ruled or assisted by natural reason itself: Which yet is highly useful many way, in so far as it is first enlightened by revelation or ruled and assisted by the divine word and a divine faith. Sense and natural reason then are no otherwise necessary to faith than this, that the subject of faith be a rational creature, a man, and not a stone. And to say that this is an absolutely necessary help to faith, is just to answer a grave question in divinity with a poor quirk of logic; and a blending together those things that are quite different. For example: If I should ask a question relating to the art of architecture, what is necessary to the artful building of fine house? and the answer is, stones or brick are absolutely necessary, because without stones or brick he cannot build a fine house; the answer might be reckoned very ridiculous, however true, because it is out of purpose, and relates only to the materials of the building, but not at all to the art of it. Even so much and more out of the way is it to assert, that there is no believing in Christ as God-man, without an imaginary idea of him as man. It is a blending of things quite different, yea, and directly opposite, so far as sense is opposite to faith, and nature to grace.

I am persuaded, many exercised souls find to be their sin that very thing which Mr. Robe represents as a duty necessary to a right thinking of Christ as God-man in one person, namely, that they have an imaginary idea of him as man. It costs them many heavy thoughts and fears, lest they be worshipping but an image of their own framing, an idol and representation of a man formed in their mind by their own imagination, instead of the true God in Christ, or God in our nature. This is matter of exercise to them, that, their mind being naturally carnal, they are so ready to have carnal view of this spiritual object of faith. No doubt the carnal conceptions of Christ as man, that through the flesh are unavoidable and involuntary, the Lord will pardon in his own, who strive, through his grace, to act spiritually and believingly. But, to preach up the necessity of that which all the true saints of God will find to be their plague, is one of the dreadful effects of the delusion of the day we live in.

An imaginary idea hath no more knowledge in it, than the scripture ascribes to an ox that knows his owner, or an ass that know his master’s crib, Isa. i. 3. It is no part of rational knowledge: I say again, that the imaginary idea of Christ as man is no part, no branch itself, of rational knowledge; far less of revealed religion. It belongs not to the rational, but the brutish part of a man. No man guided by reason and judgment, far les by the Spirit of God, could bring in this as any help to, or any part of religion; which belongs not to the knowledge that is in rational creatures as such, but rather to the knowledge brute beasts have an equal share of with men, 2 Pet. ii. 12. where some men are compared to natural brute beasts. And, Jude, verse 10. it is said that some speak evil of things which they know not: But what they know naturally as brute beasts; in those things they corrupt themselves. Where we see that brute beasts have natural knowledge, that is, without reason and judgment. Such a knowledge is an imaginary idea of any corporeal thing. This is a knowledge that all men have, in so far as they have but the sensitive life of brutes. None can speak of a bird in the air, a beast in the field, or fish in the sea, or whatever else, but presently the imaginary idea or image of that bodily thing spoke of, will be formed in the brain: Whether it be absent, if it be but spoke of into the ear, or present to the eye, the image of it is in the head. And so far even a brute beast. A dog, though he hath not the understanding of words, yet hath an imaginary idea of his master, whether present or absent. If he be present, he shews it by fawning upon him, and distinguishing between him and thousands of other men in a crowd. The imaginary idea of Christ as man, an absent man, this idea having no other object but what is corporeal, how far it differs from the natural knowledge of a brute beast, may be easily considered. The great difference lies in the subject; but neither in the act, nor object, nor faculty acting upon it. The act is the imaginary idea, which brutes may have; the object is a man as he is a corporeal thing, which also the brute hath an idea of; the faculty is the sensitive corporeal power, which the brute beasts also have: Only the subject or agent here is a rational creature, not acting rationally, like himself, by the right use of natural reason. But, while he hath no more than that imaginary idea acting, so as to confine his act within the narrow bounds of his natural sensation or imagination, he can know no more, but what he knows naturally as brute beasts. And what things men know this way, in those things they corrupt themselves, says the apostle. Where, if he speaks of sensual corruptions and brutish lusts, the argument holds the more strongly with relation to men’s corrupting and defiling their minds by carnal images or brutish imaginations of spiritual things; and that, in so far as filthiness of the spirit is yet more abominable before God than that of the flesh. This brutish knowledge is particularly spoken of in scripture with reference to idolaters; and, being applied to gross idolatry, is equally applicable to mental imagery, which is the secret chamber from which all outward images are brought: Jer. x. 14, 15, 16. Every man is brutish in his knowledge: every founder is confounded by the graven image: for his molten image is falsehood, and there is no breath in them. They are vanity, and the work of errors: in the time of their visitation they shall perish. The portion of Jacob is not like them: for he is the former of all things; and Israel is the rod of his inheritance: The LORD of hosts is his name. It was said, verse 8. They are altogether brutish and foolish: The stock is a doctrine of vanities. And the same words are repeated, chap. li. 17, 18, 19. Of this brutish knowledge also we read, Hos. xiii. 2. where it is said, they made them idols according to their own understanding; that is, says Henry, “according to their own fancy. They consulted with themselves what shape they should make it in, and made it accordingly; a god, according to the best of their judgment, or, according to their own likeness, in the form of a man. And, when they made their idols, men like themselves in shape, they made themselves tocks and stones like them in reality: For, they that made them, are like unto them; and so is every one that trusteth in them, Psal. cxv. 8.” Idols and images are first the work of men’s heads, and then the work of their hands. They are shaped first by their fancy, and then by their fingers; because what they know naturally as brute beasts, in these things, they corrupt themselves. All the Popish pictures of Christ are owing to this natural knowledge or imaginary idea of Christ as man.

Thus we may see what sort of knowledge Mr. Robe’s ideal doctrine belongs to. The natural understanding of man, as man, is with reason and judgment; but what they know naturally without these, is no other than that of brute beasts, which have sense and imagination. And Mr. Robe himself distinguishes several times between those corporeal faculties that discern no more but corporeal things, and the faculty of understanding; consequently, his imaginary ideas are no other part of natural understanding, than that of brute beasts, without reason and judgment. It is true, in his letter he frequently confounds his imaginary ideas with knowledge, as if to know that Christ is man, and to have an imaginary idea of him as man, were alternatives, or one and the same thing. But, as his explication of the object of all his imaginary ideas, making them merely corporeal, will not quadrate with its being the same with the knowledge of any truth; so, if, notwithstanding this, he makes his knowledge and his imaginary idea the same, then either by his sensitive knowledge he means rational, or by rational he means sensitive; or else they are so blended by him, as to have no meaning at all, while reason is not employed to distinguish the one from the other.

Alas! his carnal and natural imagination of a corporeal object, which is called Christ as man, does nothing but darken and abuse his understanding, and destroys all right thoughts and conceptions of Christ, till God in mercy blow away that dark cloud, and send forth his light and his truth.

An imaginary idea then relates to some other thing than either the rational knowledge, or the real faith and belief of Christ’s being God-man. It relates only to what is corporeal, and what may be seen or fancied; but to nothing intelligible or credible: for it is neither the object of faith nor of unbelief. It is neither a truth nor a falsehood in itself; But, as it is applied to the true Christ, it is a false and fictitious representation of him.

I shall further exemplify both the fallacy and folly of Mr. Robe’s argument, from some homely similes, shewing that no proposition relating to any the most common truths, can be the object of an imaginary idea. For example, let one at a distance be told, that there is a man called Mr. Robe that is minister in Kilsyth. Why, says Mr. Robe, he cannot believe this; nay, I defy him, and says it is impossible, (for in this manner he speaks) to believe it without the imaginary idea of a man. Very true; and I shall add, he cannot do it, without the imaginary idea of a place called Kilsyth. Nay, besides this, I shall add he must have an intellectual idea of a minister; for that is the name of an office which none can make an image of in his brain, unless he should paint there the likeness of a man in a pulpit, with a Bible in his hand, and call that a minister. But the ministerial office, as such, requires intellectuals to form a right idea of it. But, though this should be added to the former, let any man tell me, whether it be agreeable with good sense to say, that none can believe that Mr. Robe is a man that is minister in Kilsyth, without the imaginary idea of a man and a place so designed? Or, suppose that should be easily granted; yet what help does that imaginary idea give to his belief of that truth? since the truth of that proposition must depend upon the testimony of him that informs this man at a distance anent it, and not upon his imaginary idea of a man and a place; for these are corporeal things, and visible, that are the object of sense: But the truth of the proposition, being an incorporeal thing, cannot be received by sense, but by reason and judgment, convinced of it upon the credit and fidelity of the informer. Nay, I will say further, that the imaginary idea or mental image of a man cannot so much as help me to believe that Mr. Robe is a man. This I will prove by what follows. That he is a man, is a proposition or assertion: And no imaginary idea can conceive a proposition or assertion of any truth, unless that proposition had a corporeal form; which if it had, would not be a thing to be believed, but a thing to be seen or fancied. That idea may conceive the matter of a proposition, viz. a human body; but that matter, being a corporeal thing, is in itself neither a truth nor a falsehood; and therefore can neither be believed nor disbelieved, till something be proposed or asserted concerning it. Which proposition or assertion be what it will, is the object of an intellectual idea, but not of an imaginative one. Therefore the imaginary idea of a man cannot so much as help me to believe that Mr. Robe is a man, or that he has a body like other men. Common philosophy teaches, according to Aristotle and his followers, That acts of the intellect, called simple apprehension, have neither truth nor falsehood for their object; while nothing is therein either -affirmed or denied. What help then can Mr. Robe’s imaginary idea that he talks of give me in order to believe that he is a man; seeing this idea neither affirms nor denies it? Why, says his argument, this idea is absolutely necessary, because it is impossible for you to believe any man is a minister, without the imaginary idea of a man, and Mr. Robe is as surely a man as he is a minister. Here is a strong and unanswerable like assertion; but yet to no purpose: For still the question remains untouched, What help does the imaginary idea of a man afford me to believe that Mr. Robe is a man or a minister? If it should be told or affirmed, that he is a man, then I have some ground to believe or not. The report may indeed help; but the imaginary idea tells me nothing at all about him, but leaves me to form in my head what image of him I please, an ordinary or a monstrous man. But (says he) you cannot believe what you have no conception of. Well; but still, the question being not about the rational conception of a truth or a falsehood, but an imaginary conceptions of what is corporeal; if this conception, not the report, be the rule of my belief, and a help to it, then I am obliged to believe according to my conception; and consequently, at this rate, if my imaginary idea conceive of him as a monster, I am obliged to believe it. Here then we see the sum total of Mr. Robe’s philosophy, and what issue it comes to. If I should infer from what I have just now said, that I do not believe him to be a man, because I say an imaginary idea can give me no help to believe it; the inference would be as native and judicious, as that wherein he charged me with heresy and blasphemy. Though the subjects infinitely differ, yet the cases in point of argument are parallel.

Further, let this be the truth mentioned, namely, That Paul was an apostle. Now, according to Mr. Robe, here it is requisite, first, an imaginary idea of a man; for Paul is the name of a man. 2ndly, An intellectual idea of an apostle; which, being the name of an office, cannot be the object of a corporeal or imaginative idea. Now, what help to the belief of this truth is the first of these ideas, namely, the imaginary idea of a man? The more I dwell upon this idea of a man, the further I am from the belief of this truth, That Paul was an apostle; for that idea does not concern the truth at all, but merely the corporeal image of a man in the head: which the more I continue to gaze at, the more am I detained from the belief of this truth, That he was an apostle. The image is no part of the object of that faith at all. Some say he was a little man; and so then form the image of a little men. Whatever man he was, little or big, is that nay part of the object of this faith, namely, my believing that he was an apostle? But, says Mr. Robe’s argument, it is impossible for you to believe that the man Paul was an apostle, without the imaginary idea of a man: Therefore this is absolutely necessary to that faith, because he was as surely a man as he was an apostle. May not any person see what an idle story this is; and how it is a confounding the object of faith with the object of sense and fancy; and a making that necessary to faith which has no relation to it, and is nothing but a solemn trifling? If any say, you cannot think of a heart of stone, without the imaginary idea of a stone; therefore that idea is such an absolutely necessary part of knowledge, that without it you cannot know what a heart of stone is. Is not here a miserable confounding the sensitive with the rational part of a man; yea, sensitive ideas with spiritual knowledge most absurdly? A stone may give occasion, but no help, to think of heart-obduration or hardness; which is a spiritual plague of the heart, that cannot be known or seen but with a spiritual eye. The sight or thought of the material hardness of a stone can give no proper help. Separate the sensitive from the rational part, there is no more knowledge in the former than some beasts have, which know the difference between a man and a stone, as well as we can do, with all our mere sensitive powers. It is indeed impossible to believe that Christ is God-man, without having the faith of his human nature. But it is impossible to have the faith so much as of his being man, or of his human nature, while we have but an imaginary idea of him as man; which while it lasts we are under the necessity of suspending the thoughts of his being God, and so of giving way to atheism. To say or suppose, that we cannot believe that Christ is God-man, without an imaginary idea of him as man, which is that moment an abstracting from the consideration of his being God, by turning to the sensitive idea of a human body, which is no man, is it not as good sense for me to say, that Mr. Robe, without the idea of a worm, cannot believe this scriptural position, Psalm xxii. 6. That Christ is a worm, and no man? which is an abstracting from the consideration of his being man, and betaking himself to the sensitive or corporeal idea of a worm; for these are both true, That Christ as man is not God, and, That Christ as a worm is no man. Hence common sense may infer, that, at this rate, we cannot believe that Christ is God-man without an imaginary idea, importing, that he is neither God nor man. It is little wonder when Mr. Robe goes out of God’s way in matters of faith, into the field of vain imaginations, that he involves himself in the mire of inextricable absurdities.

While Mr. Robe says the imaginary idea helps one to believe, it should be considered, things are not credible, because they are imaginable; otherwise indeed the imagination would help to believe. But, though some things utter able are not credible, because they are not imaginable, (as, if one should speak of a mountain without a valley, this, we may say, cannot be believed, because it cannot be imagined); yet things are not therefore credible because they are imaginable. For example, a golden moutnain: Every man that can form an image of gold, and an image of a mountain, can also, whenever he hears of a golden mountain, form the image of it in his brain; yea, necessarily does so, upon hearing of it with attention. Now, if one shall assert, that a hill near Kilsyth, commonly called, Take me down, is a golden mountain, only hid and covered with a little earth and grass, Mr. Robe says he cannot believe this without the imaginary idea of a golden mountain. Well; but if this idea makes it credible, or helps him to believe it, then he may try his hand, by digging, in order to enrich himself. But to bring the simile yet nearer to his way of arguing: Will this idea of a mountain help him to believe it is a golden mountain; because it is impossible for him to believe it is so, without the imaginary idea of a mountain? By no means can these help one another; because the one being imaginable, does not make the other credible; and that in regard that that things imaginable, as such, are not within the same circle of knowledge with the same things as they are credible: They relate not to ideas of the same kind; but the one to the ideas of sense or sensation, the other to these of reason, or intellection. Far less will it hold true, that the imaginary idea of Christ as man, will help to believe that he is God man. For, as this is a matter of faith, both the manhood and Godhead are within the same circle of knowledge, grounded upon divine revelation, namely, spiritual rational knowledge. But to bring in an imaginary idea here, is to go down below the sphere of reason itself, into the depth of sensation, for help and assistance to faith.

I have shewed elsewhere, that the imaginary idea of Christ as man cannot help to believe that he is man. But if, according to Mr. Robe, it can help to believe that he is God-man, it seems to import this gross absurdity, that, because he is God-man, the imaginary idea of him as man will help to believe that he is God; because he is man, as well as God, in one person. If this be not the intention of the speaker (as the schools says, Intentio operis & operantis) it is the intention of the speech. But, as it would be absurd to say, one cannot believe the saints at the resurrection will have a spiritual body, without the imaginary idea of a body, and that this idea of a body helps to believe it to be a spiritual body; so it is equally absurd to say, the imaginary idea of Christ as man, helps to believe that he is God-man; because this a blending of what belongs to sense with what belongs to faith.

Mr. Robe seems miserably to confound the subject believing with the means and helps of faith. The subject believing, is one that hath sense and reason, one the hath a sensitive idea to apprehend bodies that are the objects of sense; and an intellectual idea to apprehend things incorporeal, according to the measure and capacity of his reason and judgment: which surely one would think renders him more capable to understand the objects of faith, than all the imaginary ideas in the world. Now, though the object of faith can be no visible thing or corporeal; yet, if that object have an adjunct, or something adventitious, as I said before, that is relating to it, that is corporeal, and so not the proper object of faith in itself, but only as it is related to faith’s proper object; who will adventure to say, that that adjunct, or adventitious thing, is properly, or in itself, any part of the object of faith; because, being corporeal, none can take up the proper object of faith, without an imaginary idea of it? Or to say, that this idea is helpful to that faith? All the matter is, he is a subject of faith that hath an imaginary idea of corporeal things. While we live in this body, the soul and body live together, which makes up a human person. And therefore the sum of Mr. Robe’s logic on this head is, that, seeing soul and body make one person, he cannot believe he hath a soul without the imaginary idea of a body. Alas! what a miserable help is this to the faith of his having an immortal soul, that he cannot believe it without the imaginary idea of a mortal body; nor believe there is a spirit in him, without an imaginary idea of flesh? But, let him multiply these ideas in infinitum, he will be as wise about the nature of spirits as he was at first. What though, while he thinks the soul and body are unite in one human nature, the sensitive idea relating to the body intrude itself into the company of the intellectual idea, that thinks upon a spirit, which consists of no corporeal thing, but merely of understanding, will, and the like spiritual things? Does the presence of the foresaid [introdev p. 90], presenting the image of a body, give him any help or assistance in the knowledge of the nature of the soul, or the belief of its being? Nay, I trow that object of sense, or image by the sensitive idea, will rather tend to give him a wrong notion of that which is the proper object of the intellectual idea. Even so does the imaginary idea of Christ as man, intruding itself into the company of faith, instead of being helpful or profitable, tends only to give misshapen notions of the proper object of faith.

Again, to add no more to the number of examples, let one suppose for a truth, that there is a man in the moon. The first thing, according to Mr. Robe’s argument, that is absolutely necessary for believing this, is, that you have an imaginary idea of a man. Why so? Because it is impossible for you to believe that there is a man in the moon, without this idea. Very true; none can hear of a man anywhere, but it presently raises the idea of a man in his head. But will any person say, that this idea of a man in the moon will help me to believe that there is a man there? Or is this fanciful idea any part of the object of that belief? But, when this argument is applied to spiritual things, such solemn trifling in the matters of God intolerable.

I am almost ashamed to be obliged so oft to repeat this childish and foolish manner of speech with application to such a great and grave subject, as that of believing in the Son of God, or believing in him as God-man. Why? The idea of Christ as man, is so far from being absolutely necessary and helpful to the faith of this mysterious object, a God-man, that it cannot in the least help me to believe, as I said before, that he is man: Nay, as it excludes necessarily the faith of his being God, because as man he is not God; so it includes not the faith of his being man; for this truth, That he is man, is a scripture truth, an object of faith, and so no object of any imaginary idea. Yea, this imaginary idea of Christ as man, not only does not include the faith of this truth, That he is man, but excludes it also; in so far as sense and sight exclude faith and believing. For, when the figure of a man, or the figure of a cross, as Mr. Robe speaks, is before the eyes of the mind, then it is no object of faith, but of sight. So that the imaginary idea of Christ as man, instead of helping to believe in him as God-man, will rather help to believe that he is neither God nor man, for it excludes the faith of both. But, I must tell Mr. Robe, that it is impossible for any to believe savingly, that Christ is God-man, without having the faith of his human nature, as well as of his divine, in one person; because the faith of that person, thus clothed with our nature, includes both: Whereas it is impossible to have an imaginary idea of Christ as man, without excluding by that idea that idea the faith of his being either God or man; because the image or dagon of sense, as long as it stands, is directly opposite to the ark of faith.

Again, an imaginary idea of Christ as man, whether it be considered subjectively, or objectively, I mean in the view of it self, by the fancy and imagination, or in the object viewed, a human creature, belongs not even to Christian morals, far less to Christian mysteries. It belongs neither to moral philosophy, nor to Christian knowledge, nor practice, but merely to things natural and animal, as such. Let me exemplify this in the first question of our Catechism, What is the chief end of man? According to Mr. Robe, the first thing requisite and necessary to the forming of man’s chief end, is to have an imaginary idea of man*[* To speak in Mr. Robe’s language; for I own, man, or mankind, being an universal term, cannot be the object of that idea.]. Why? Because it is impossible to know man’s chief end without it. Very true: But here is such a confounding and blending of things that are every way distinct, that any man of sense would accuse him of blockish stupidity, that would make this one of the means or helps for knowing what the chief end of man is; because that imaginary idea of man belongs not at all to this subject. It belongs to physics, but not to ethics; that is, to natural, but not to morals; to the mind, as it is conversant about bodily things, but not about spirituals. In a word, it belongs to sense, not to faith; to nature, not to grace, or religion. It belongs not so much as even to natural religion, but merely to natural sensation; yea, not to natural reflection, as it is a mere imaginary idea. And hence, though it is true, that none can know what is man’s chief end without an imaginary idea of man; yet so extraneous is this to that point of knowledge, that, instead of being helpful to it, I appeal to all mankind that have the use of natural reason, if an imaginary idea of a man, so far as it is pored upon, would not be a manifest impediment and hindrance to the knowledge of this point in divinity, relating to man’s chief end?

Likewise, Mr. Robe making this the first thing that belongs to the knowledge of Christ, or to the right thinking of him, namely, to have an imaginary idea of him as man, it is a beginning to think of him, by denying that he is God; because, seeing as man he is not God, to maintain that this is the first thing that belongs to the right knowledge and thought of him, is to maintain that we ought to think of him in a way wherein he is not God, or to conceive of him in a sense wherein he is neither a God, nor a person, nor a subject wherein that which we think of, does exist. The subject wherein that humanity exists, being his divine person, which cannot be the object of any imaginary idea; to begin therefore to think of Christ by an imaginary idea of him as man, is to begin with atheism, or with a thought that necessarily excludes his Deity, and cannot include it; because Christ as man cannot be God. Therefore, as long as he uses that first help, namely, an imaginary idea of him as man, he brings himself under a necessity of denying that he is God, as the first means of believing that he is God; as if the imagination of his being man, were the first mean of believing him to be God. If the grand enemy that goes about seeking whom he may devour, had been plotting, ever since Christ’s incarnation, to rub an affront upon him, he never fell upon a better method to deface the Deity of our Immanuel, than by using this stratagem of the absolute necessity, in the first place, of having an imaginary idea of Christ as man, without which they cannot believe that he is God or God-man. For, if the devil gets them once to begin their knowledge of Christ with a strong imagination about his manhood, he will endeavor to fix and fortify that imagination; which, according to the nature of things, cannot include, but necessarily excludes the believing consideration of his Godhead. Thus, in a new way, never declared so barefacedly as now, the god of this world blinds the minds of them that believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them, 2 Cor. iv. 4. The god of this world blinds the minds of men with imaginary ideas about the corporeal things of this world many ways; but by no way more dangerous and deceitful than this of representing Christ, our glorious God-man Redeemer, the mysterious object of faith, as a corporeal object of sense, made present to the fancy, under the figure, or by the image of a man, instead of beholding him as the image of God; or making this image of a man necessary to the beholding of him as the image of God. May the God who is light, send forth his light and his truth, and save all his people from such gross darkness, that tends to hide the glory of the gospel from the eyes of men: For, if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost.

Again, the imaginary idea of Christ as man, being made by Mr. Robe the first thing needful to the right knowledge of Christ, and a necessary mean and help to it, it is a plain inverting of God’s method of teaching, and an overturning of the order of Christian doctrine and saving knowledge. What system of divinity can any man produce that ever made any part of divine Christian knowledge to begin with the imaginary idea of Christ as man? We have used our Shorter Catechism as a most excellent and compendious system, for the teaching of people the fundamental principles of religion; and it is remarkable there, that, as we are taught first the knowledge of God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one God, and of our sinful miserable state, by our departure from him, before ever we hear of Christ; so, when Christ the Redeemer is described, he is set forth first in his person, under the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God; who, being so, became man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and man in two distinct natures and one person for ever. This account begins and ends with the person of Christ; there is no word of an imaginary idea of Christ as man; far less any idea of his manhood being the first thing requisite to the knowledge of this glorious divine person, who, by an inconceivable mystery, assumed our human nature into his personality, who was from all eternity the second person of the glorious Trinity, and whose human nature never subsisted in any other person, and never existed, till assumed by him into that hypostatical union. Now, to make the imaginary idea of him as man the first thing necessary to the knowledge of this infinitely glorious person, the God-man, is, in my opinion, such a subversion of the due order and method of Christian knowledge, as makes that the beginning of it, which yet is neither the beginning nor the end. The person of Christ is, I may say, even in this sense, both the first and the last, the beginning and the end of Christian knowledge. But the imaginary idea of him as man is neither; and cannot so much as help one to know that he is man, far less that he is God-man. Further,

How strange is the doctrine that necessarily imports that the object of faith is so divided, that one part of it is the object of any man’s fancy, and another the object properly of faith; yea, that that which is the object of fancy is properly the object of faith? Christ’s humanity, simply as such, cannot be the object of faith, any other way than as it is either a revealed truth of God, or a person; or else it must be a created thing or matter. In the last sense, it cannot be the object of faith, otherwise a mere creature, a mere human body, and soul, is a part of the object of faith; which is gross. The immediate object of faith is the word. Now, the human nature of Christ, abstractly viewed, cannot be the object of faith otherwise than as it is a revealed truth, that he is man, and is clothed with our nature. And here it is not his humanity, that is the object of faith properly, but the word declaring this truth. It is not his humanity as represented to our idea, that is the object of faith, but his humanity as it is revealed in the word; which is the glass wherein alone faith sees it. Faith cometh by hearing what God says, and so credits it, as a truth revealed in the world: But faith cometh not by seeing any form or figure of his humanity, represented to the fancy or imaginary idea. Faith believes it as it is a truth revealed in the word, not as it is a thing formed in the fancy, which must be hurtful, but cannot be helpful to faith. It is true, we cannot believe that whereof we have no knowledge or conception. But then, this spiritual conception arises not from the imaginary idea, but from spiritual illumination, or light shining on the word, and by the word, into the understanding, which is the first thing God works upon.

Saving faith, no doubt, imports, among other things, a believing the truth of the fact, that Christ did really become man, assume our nature, and therein died and rose again in our room; and a believing this upon his own testimony, not merely upon the historical evidence of the thing, which is but an historical faith; but a believing it upon the divine testimony, which is a part of divine and saving faith, to which no natural idea of ours can contribute any help. That which is the object of that idea, cannot be the object of faith: Nor can that idea be the glass wherein I see any part of the object of faith; for God never gave it that honor, nor appointed it to be the mean of faith; it is no ordinance of God for helping us to faith. Take away the revelation of this truth, or the divine testimony about it, and you take away faith. There remains nothing indeed but an imaginary idea: For faith can have no footing but upon a truth to be believed, or a person to be believed in.

The proper and immediate object of faith is verum, a truth declared and made known. The gospel hence is called a record, a report, a saying, a faithful saying. It is true, it contains a good also, worthy of all acceptation; and so bonum may be also reckoned the object of faith; but not so properly, unless it be considered as bonum oblatum, or a good offered and exhibited; and only as it is revealed in the word, as it is the object of faith. The summum bonum itself, the chief good, which is God himself, cannot properly be the object of faith, but as he is revealed, or reveals himself. We believe his being and perfection upon his own testimony. Thus we cannot receive Christ, nor rest upon him for salvation, nor make him the object of our faith, but as he is revealed and offered in the gospel. Take away this revelation, this offer, this word of grace or promise, and then there can be no receiving or resting upon Christ by faith, but only by mere imagination, and unprofitable fancy. Now, if the proper object of faith be a truth in the word, how can the imaginary idea of Christ’s humanity be helpful to it? while that idea necessarily changes the place of that humanity, from being a truth in the word, to a fancy or imagination of it in the head? For, as it is there, it can be no part of the object of faith. As it is a truth in the word, we, by faith, conceive of it believingly to be what it is. But as it is represented in the fancy or imagination, it is neither a truth to be believed, nor a person to be believed in. (1.) It is not a truth to be believed; for now it is away out of the word, which is the object of ground of faith, and into the head, as the object of imagination; where faith hath no footing, nothing to build upon but a notion, a dream. Nor, (2.) Is it a person to be believed in; being only an imaginary  idea of his human nature, and not of his person. A truth to be believed, cannot lie in any man’s fancy, but only in the word. A person to be believed in cannot lie in the idea of Christ’s human nature; which never was a person. How then can that be any part of the object of faith, which is neither a truth for faith to believe, nor a person for faith to be believed in, according to the word of God? To trust then to a Christ as formed in the imagination, and seen by the help of an imaginary idea, is not faith, but fancy, and a deep delusion.

In a word, an imaginary idea of Christ as man, or in his human nature, (which Mr. Robe so often repeats and owns, cannot include the person of Christ,) can be helpful to no purpose in the world, far less to faith; no more than the grasping at a shadow can help to take hold of a substance. For human nature in the abstract, without being considered in a person, cannot be the object of any idea whatsoever; because it is a nonentity, a thing that hath no being or existence, but in a person or persons. In any other human but Christ, human nature is the same with the person. But, the human nature of Christ not being his person, an imaginary idea of it is an idea of it in the abstract; which therefore is nothing but a shadow, an image, a nothing. Mr. Robe, then, in attempting to find out heresy and blasphemy in my doctrine, has plunged himself more deeply into a horrible pit of abominable idolatry, where he is found worshipping a shadow, as the object of his faith. He knew very well, that I made the human nature of Christ, when rightly understood, as subsisting in the person of the Son of God, to be so much the object of faith, that I could not allow it to be the object of an imaginary idea, without defacing and debasing it, and making it no more Christ’s true humanity, but the vile picture of the least part of it. It is no wonder that I cannot allow of any imaginary idea of Christ as man, however it obtrude itself, like a devil, upon my own imagination as well as Mr. Robe’s. For, as in divinity it is absurd and monstrous; so, in philosophy, it is scarce agreeable with common sense, even to speak of an imaginary idea of a mere man, (as I have saidJ For, even according to Mr. Robe himself, it is impossible that a man as such can be the object of an imaginary idea without an intellectual one; because a man is not a mere body, but soul and body unite, constituting one person: Which relation and conjunction no philosopher will allow that it can be conceived by any idea of mere sensation. But Mr. Robe will have, by his doctrine, the human nature of Christ to be the object of every, or any man’s imaginary idea, and yet as such the object of faith also; yea, so essential to faith, as a help to it, that he that ventures to deny this must be charged with blasphemy, as if he denied the human nature of Christ to be the object of faith in any other respect; because he denies it to be the object of his imaginary idea. Such a mixture of impudence and ignorance can hardly be paralleled. But I desire to speak soberly; for what absurdities will poor men run themselves into, when God leaves them to themselves, and gives them up to strong delusions? so strong sometimes that those who are under the power them, will charge them all likewise with blasphemy that venture to call them so.